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ABSTRACT
How does rising foreign investment influence domestic economic activity? Firms whose foreign
operations grow rapidly exhibit coincident rapid growth of domestic operations, but this pattern
alone is inconclusive, as foreign and domestic business activities are jointly determined. This study
uses foreign GDP growth rates, interacted with lagged firm-specific geographic distributions of
foreign investment, to predict changes in foreign investment by a large panel of American firms.
Estimates produced using this instrument for changes in foreign activity indicate that 10% greater
foreign capital investment is associated with 2.2% greater domestic investment, and that 10% greater
foreign employee compensation is associated with 4.0% greater domestic employee compensation.
Changes in foreign and domestic sales, assets, and numbers of employees are likewise positively
associated; the evidence also indicates that greater foreign investment is associated with additional
domestic exports and R&D spending. The data do not support the popular notion that greater foreign
activity crowds out domestic activity by the same firms, instead suggesting the reverse.
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Escalating activity abroad by American companies concerns many observers who fear 
that outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) reduces employment, capital investment, and tax 
revenue in the United States, replacing all of these with foreign counterparts that contribute 
distantly, if at all, to the U.S. economy.  An alternative, and rather less common, perspective 
suggests that growing foreign investment may instead increase levels of domestic activity by 
making American companies more competitive, thereby increasing the value and magnitude of 
their domestic operations as they expand globally.  Since either of these scenarios is possible in 
theory, and doubtless there are individual instances of each, empirical analysis is necessary to 
identify the average effects of changes in foreign activity on the domestic operations of 
American firms. 
This paper evaluates the domestic impact of foreign economic activity by analyzing 
confidential affiliate-level information on the activities of American manufacturing firms 
between 1982 and 1999.  Use of these data permits individual foreign operations to be matched 
to the domestic activities of the same firms; as a result, it is possible to measure the extent to 
which expansions in foreign business activity coincide with changes in domestic activity.  There 
is a strong positive correlation between the domestic and foreign growth rates of multinational 
firms, which is consistent with the intuition that expanded foreign operations encourage firms to 
increase their domestic operations, but the fact that foreign and domestic operations are jointly 
determined makes such evidence inconclusive.  Investment and desired output are functions of 
many variables that influence firm profitability, some of which are inevitably omitted from any 
empirical analysis, and these omissions may themselves induce positive or negative correlations 
between foreign and domestic activities.  For example, the discovery of a new drug by a 
pharmaceutical company may be manifest in coincident positive growth of activity both abroad 
and at home.  Alternatively, shifting consumer sentiments might make a consumer products 
company’s wares appear less attractive at home and more attractive abroad, with resulting effects 
on sales and investment in the two locations. 
The use of instrumental variables that predict foreign investment but do not directly 
affect domestic operations has the potential to identify any effect of foreign investment on   2
domestic business activity.  The economic performance of foreign economies has promise as 
such an instrument.  Since the locations of foreign investments differ significantly between 
firms, it is possible to construct firm-specific weighted averages of foreign GDP growth.  These 
firm-specific foreign economic growth rates can be used to generate predicted growth rates of 
foreign activity that are then employed to explain changes in domestic activity. 
This empirical procedure effectively compares two American firms, one whose foreign 
investments in 1982 were concentrated in Britain, and another whose foreign investments were 
concentrated in France.  As the British economy subsequently grew more rapidly than the French 
economy, the firm with British operations should exhibit more rapid growth of foreign 
investment than would the firm with French operations.  If the domestic activities of the firm 
with British operations grow at different rates than the domestic activities of the firm with 
French operations, it may then be appropriate interpret the difference as reflecting the impact of 
changes in foreign operations. 
The data indicate that foreign GDP growth rates are strong predictors of subsequent 
foreign investment by American firms.  Using weighted GDP growth rates as instruments, 
second stage equations imply that 10 percent greater foreign capital investment triggers 2.2 
percent of additional domestic capital investment, and that 10 percent greater foreign employee 
compensation is associated with 4.0 percent greater domestic employee compensation.  There are 
similar positive relationships between foreign and domestic changes in sales, assets, and numbers 
of employees. 
The positive association between changes in foreign and domestic activities persists in 
supplemental specifications designed to address alternative interpretations of the main results.  
The use of weighted foreign economic growth rates as instruments for changes in foreign 
investment has the potential to produce misleading results if the foreign investments of firms 
planning rapid expansion of domestic investment are disproportionately attracted to economies 
expected to grow rapidly.  It is possible to construct economic growth surprises by regressing 
foreign GDP growth against lagged GDP growth, and to use the residuals from this equation 
instead of actual GDP growth in explaining foreign investment; this substitution produces very 
similar results.  Another possibility is that industry-specific shocks might be responsible for the   3
correlation of foreign and domestic investment growth rates, though the inclusion of industry-
period constants again changes the results very little.  If firms export to, and invest in, the same 
countries, foreign economic growth rates might stimulate domestic economic activity directly.  
This can be controlled for by including an additional variable equal to export-weighted foreign 
economic growth, which again does not alter the results.  Finally, there are circumstances in 
which real exchange rate movements that are correlated with economic growth rates might 
independently influence both foreign and domestic activity, but replicating the analysis with 
controls for firm-specific changes in foreign exchange rates yields similar answers. 
There are several channels through which foreign activities can influence the scope of 
domestic operations, including cases in which foreign production requires inputs of tangible or 
intellectual property produced in the home country.  The same instrumental variables method 
used to identify the effect of foreign investment on domestic investment can also be used to 
identify the effect of foreign investment on other types of domestic activity.  The estimates 
indicate that greater foreign activity is associated with higher exports from American parent 
companies to their foreign affiliates and is also associated with greater domestic R&D spending. 
The nature of the instrumental variables procedure makes it possible to analyze only 
firms with prior foreign investments, since it is the geographic distribution of these investments, 
interacted with GDP growth rates, that predicts changes in foreign operations.  Hence this 
procedure does not measure the impact on domestic activities of establishing foreign operations 
for the first time.  Furthermore, the analysis is inherently partial equilibrium in nature, comparing 
changes in one firm against changes in another at the same time.  Possible policy reforms, 
including tax and regulatory changes, that would encourage or discourage foreign investment, 
affecting all firms in the economy at the same time, would also likely influence factor prices and 
output prices in a way that might indirectly influence levels of domestic economic activities.  
The empirical work in this paper considers reactions by individual firms to changes in their own 
foreign operations, providing an important part, though not all, of the evidence necessary to 
evaluate the impact of the foreign operations of American firms on total U.S. domestic economic 
activity.   4
Previous studies report mixed results in analyzing the impact of foreign operations on 
domestic economic activity.  Lipsey (1995) analyzes a cross-section of American multinational 
firms, reporting a mild positive correlation between foreign production and domestic 
employment levels.  Stevens and Lipsey (1992) analyze the investment behavior of seven 
multinational firms, concluding that investments in different locations substitute for each other 
due to costly external financing.  The absence of compelling instruments that satisfy the 
necessary exclusion restrictions complicate the interpretation of this evidence, a problem that 
likewise appears in studies of aggregate FDI and domestic investment.  Feldstein (1995) analyzes 
decade-long averages of aggregate FDI and domestic investment in OECD economies, reporting 
evidence that direct investment abroad reduces domestic investment levels.  Devereux and 
Freeman (1995) come to a different conclusion in their study of bilateral flows of aggregate 
investment funds between seven OECD countries, finding no evidence of tax-induced 
substitution between domestic and foreign investment, and Desai, Foley and Hines (forthcoming) 
report time series evidence that foreign and domestic investment are positively correlated for 
American firms.  Blonigen (2001) investigates the related question of whether foreign production 
by multinationals is a substitute or complement for exports, finding evidence for both effects.  
The effect of foreign operations on the domestic activities of multinational firms therefore 
remains an open question.
1   
Much of the recent theoretical and empirical work on multinational firms emphasizes 
alternative motivations for foreign direct investment (either "horizontal" or "vertical" 
motivations
2) or the reasons why alternative productive arrangements (whole ownership of 
foreign affiliates, joint ventures, exports or arms-length contracts
3) are employed.  Specifically, 
several recent papers, including Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), Yi (2003) and Hanson, Mataloni 
and Slaughter (forthcoming) emphasize the importance of vertical specialization to international 
                                                 
1 Several studies, including Brainard and Riker (1997), Riker and Brainard (1997), Slaughter (2000), Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996, 1999) and Harrison and McMillan (2004) have emphasized the link between foreign activities and 
domestic wages and employment.  Additionally, Blonigen and Wilson (1999) investigate the role of demand by 
multinational firms in determining variations in the measured substitutability of foreign and domestic goods. 
2 The horizontal FDI view represents FDI as the replication of capacity in multiple locations in response to factors 
such as trade costs, as in Markusen (1984, 2002).  The vertical FDI view represents FDI as the geographic 
distribution of production globally in response to the opportunities afforded by different markets, as in Helpman 
(1984). 
3 Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Desai, Foley and Hines (2004), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) 
and Feenstra and Hanson (2005) analyze the determinants of alternative foreign production arrangements.     5
trade patterns and the expansion strategies of multinationals firms.  The findings of this research 
– that multinational firms exhibit high degrees of integrated production – are consistent with 
sizeable effects of foreign operations on domestic activity.  Much of current U.S. tax policy is 
based on the premise that greater foreign business activity comes at the cost of reduced domestic 
activity.  Evidence to the contrary suggests that the conceptual framework used to evaluate 
policies might be due for revision, as discussed in Desai and Hines (2003). 
Section 2 of the paper sketches a simple framework for the analysis of interactions 
between the domestic and foreign operations of multinational firms.  Section 3 describes the 
available data on American direct investment abroad.  Section 4 presents empirical evidence of 
the determinants of foreign investment levels by American firms, and the impact of foreign 
investment on economic activity in the United States.  Section 5 discusses the implications of the 
empirical evidence, and section 6 is the conclusion. 
2.  The Relationship Between Foreign and Domestic Operations of Multinational Firms 
The effect of foreign operations on the domestic operations of multinational firms turns 
on production and cost considerations that might take any of a number of forms.  One possibility 
is that a multinational firm’s total worldwide production level is approximately fixed, being 
determined by market conditions and government policies.  Given that foreign and domestic 
factors of production are conditional substitutes, any additional foreign production then 
necessarily reduces domestic production, hence foreign and domestic investment levels will be 
negatively correlated.  Alternatively, the level of total production might not be fixed, but instead 
responsive to profit opportunities, the value of which is affected by foreign and domestic 
production considerations.  In such a framework it is possible that greater foreign activity 
reduces costs and raises the return to domestic production, stimulating domestic factor demand 
and domestic output.  Firms might, for example, find that foreign operations provide valuable 
intermediate inputs at low cost, or that foreign affiliates serve as ready buyers of tangible and 
intangible property produced in the United States. 
2.1.   Framework for Analysis   6
In order to distinguish these cases it is useful to consider the impact of foreign activities 
on domestic factor demands through effects on the productivity and costs of domestic operations.  
It simplifies matters to consider the case in which the firm is indifferent to the location of its 
output, as would be true if the final product is freely traded and tax differences are immaterial.  
Total output is given by the function  ( ) z x F D Q , , , , in which D is the level of domestic input, F is 
foreign input, x consists of factors that influence domestic production, and z represents factors 
that influence foreign production.  Total firm costs are given by  ( ) z x F D , , , λ .  Profits () π  equal 
the difference between the value of output (whose price is normalized to unity) and total 
production costs: 
(1)      ( ) ( ) z x F D z x F D Q , , , , , , λ π − = . 
  Since firms choose domestic and foreign inputs jointly to maximize π , it is necessary to 
specify carefully how foreign activities influence domestic operations.  Consider the impact of a 
small change in foreign inputs induced by variation in the specific foreign factor (z), such as 
might occur if there were changes in foreign government regulations or local costs.  Then the 
domestic reaction to the foreign input change can be denoted 
dF
dD
, which, as long as z does not 
affect D directly but only through its impact on F, is a valid indicator of the domestic production 
response to foreign shocks. 
  The first-order condition that characterizes the firm’s profit-maximizing choice of 
domestic inputs is: 
(2)      () ( )
D
z x F D
D





∂ , , , , , , λ
. 
The variable z is defined so that a small change does not affect the derivatives on either side of 
equation (2),








z D z D
Q λ
.   It follows from (2) that a small change in the 
factors (z) that influence foreign profitability induces changes in factor demands that satisfy: 
                                                 
4 The specification requires that the production function take a separable form such as 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) z F Q x D Q F D Q z x F D Q , , , , , , 3 2 1 + + = , and that the cost function have a similarly separable nature.   7


































which in turn implies: 


























  Equation (4) identifies the effect of production and cost considerations on the relationship 
between foreign and domestic operations,
5 including cases that are consistent with the common 
intuition that foreign inputs substitute one-for-one for domestic inputs.  If foreign and domestic 

















 and also perfect substitutes in 















, then  1 − =
dF
dD
, and greater foreign inputs displace domestic 
inputs.  If foreign and domestic inputs are perfect substitutes in production, and costs are 
separable and linear in foreign and domestic inputs  ( ) ( )( ) [ ] z bFh x aDg z x F D + = , , , λ , it is again 
the case that  1 − =
dF
dD
.  More generally, the combination of linear production costs, output that 
exhibits decreasing returns to domestic factors, and any kind of substitutability in production 













 produces outcomes in which foreign and 




There are, however, many realistic cases in which the greater use of foreign inputs might 
stimulate additional demand for domestic inputs.  For example, if output is additively separable 
                                                 
5 It is noteworthy that dD/dF in equation (4) is specific to consideration of changes in z.  A change in x generates 
changes in domestic inputs, and induced changes in foreign inputs (dF/dD) that are not symmetric with the effects of 
z, in that it need not be the case that dD/dF equals 1/(dF/dD).  Symmetry is a property of Hicksian (price) cross-
elasticities, the estimation of which requires data on prices; whereas these are quantity cross-elasticities.  Samuelson 
(1974) analyzes the properties of alternative measures of input substitutability and complementarity, including 
hybrid price and quantity measures closely related to that in equation (4).   8
into foreign and domestic production  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] z F Q x D Q z x F D Q , , , , , 2 1 + = , and firms face rising 













, but higher levels of foreign inputs reduce the marginal cost 













, then greater foreign activity stimulates additional domestic 
activity.  Foreign inputs would have this effect on domestic costs if, for example, ownership of 
foreign assets makes a domestic firm a better credit risk, thereby reducing its cost of borrowing 
to finance domestic investment.  Alternatively, if costs are separable and linear in foreign and 














, then greater foreign production stimulates higher levels of domestic activity. 
In order to illustrate how the effects of foreign operations on domestic operations would 
be manifest in specific settings, it is useful to consider a firm with a constant elasticity of 
substitution production function: 
(5)     () [] β β β
h
cF bD a z x F D Q
−








 is the elasticity of substitution between D and F, h is the (positive) degree of 











and applying the formula (4) to the production function (5) yields: 

























Some special cases are clear from examination of (6).  If the production function is linear 





− = , a negative constant.  If production exhibits constant returns to scale   9





= .  Likewise if the production function takes the Leontief form 















.  This simple exercise demonstrates that common specifications of 
production and cost functions yield very different theoretical predictions about the nature and 
sign of the effect of foreign activity on domestic activity. 
2.2.   Empirical Strategy 
Estimating the effect of foreign investment on domestic investment entails calculating 
average effects for a large and possibly heterogeneous sample.  The relationship expressed by 
equation (6) suggests that an appropriate linearization can be obtained by dividing both sides of 
(6) by (D/F), producing: 
























Equation (7) implies that the elasticity of domestic investment with respect to induced changes in 










, with  0 lim → β  
corresponding to the Cobb-Douglas function. 
  Taking the right side of (7) to be approximated by a simple constant corresponding to the 





, in which the 
constant γ  is the elasticity of domestic activity with respect to foreign activity.  This 
specification implies that D and F are related by 








, is given by:   10







γ = . 
In order to estimate the relationship expressed by equation (8) it is necessary to select the 




 around which to take the linear approximation to 
dF
dD
.  In evaluating changes it is 




, but the empirical work in the paper 
instead uses the average of start of period and end of period values.  Two considerations 
motivate this choice.  The first is that periods represent intervals between BEA benchmark 
surveys, which last five or seven years, during which firms may experience many changes.  The 
lengthy interval suggests that average values of D and F, rather than starting values, offer the 
most reliable benchmark ratio of domestic to foreign assets.  The second consideration is that 
observations of individual firms can exhibit extreme volatility in domestic and foreign growth 
rates measured using start of period values of D and F, with a small number of individual firm 








 chosen as an average of start of period and end of period values of D and F 
greatly reduces the impact of outliers, thereby producing more reliable estimates.
6 
2.3.   Instrumental Variables 
  Simple OLS regressions are capable of producing estimates of the impact of foreign 
investment on domestic investment, but obtaining reliable estimates of the sign and magnitude of 
dF
dD
requires addressing concerns about endogeneity.    Unobserved factors could induce either a 
positive or negative correlation in OLS regressions of changes in the use of domestic inputs on 
changes in the use of foreign inputs.  For example, if a firm’s research efforts produce 
innovations that improve productivity both at home and abroad, then both foreign and domestic 
operations might expand, but not because changes in foreign inputs are responsible for changes 
in domestic inputs.  Alternatively, international price movements, or changes in consumer tastes, 
                                                 
6 Construction of growth rates around averages of start and end of period values has become standard procedure in 
the analysis of firm-level job flows, as in Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (forthcoming).  Tornqvist, Vartia, and   11
might make the product that a firm produces at home less marketable, while making the 
somewhat different product produced by the firm’s foreign affiliates more marketable.  In order 
to evaluate the effects of foreign activity on domestic operations it is therefore necessary to 
employ an instrumental variables approach.  This requires identifying economic factors that 
influence levels of foreign activity, that are not themselves directly controlled by American 
investors, and that might influence levels of domestic activity only through their impact on 
foreign activity. 
Economic growth rates in foreign countries have the potential to serve as appropriate 
instruments for changes in levels of foreign investment.  Rapid economic growth is associated 
with high investment levels by local firms, presumably reflecting that marginal q, the ratio of the 
market value of capital to its replacement cost, is unusually high.  American firms with local 
operations are subject to many of the same market influences as are local firms, and therefore 
these firms are likely to expand their own investments when aggregate q is high. 
  As an empirical matter, American firms with operations in rapidly growing foreign 
economies expand their foreign operations at faster paces than do American firms whose foreign 
operations are concentrated in countries with slowly growing economies.  This pattern 
corresponds to the simple insight that rapid economic growth, and associated rising q, provides 
the greatest profit opportunities to firms with significant previous local exposure.  There are at 
least two possible channels for this effect, the first being that local experience is a valuable base 
from which business operations can be expanded when opportunities grow with the local 
economy.  The second channel is that prior local experience is a proxy for unmeasured firm 
attributes that make a firm well positioned to earn profits in some countries and not in others.  
When an economy’s q rises, then firms with attributes that match them well to the country find 
that their profit opportunities expand at the same time. 
The empirical strategy takes a firm’s initial distribution of activity among foreign 
countries to be exogenous from the standpoint of subsequent changes in domestic business 
activity.  Foreign economies grow at different rates, and with them grow levels of economic 
activity by U.S.-owned affiliates.  The first stages of the regressions use the fact that firms differ 
                                                                                                                                                             
Vartia (1985), and the appendix to Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), compare the properties of this growth rate   12
in their initial distributions of foreign economic activity to predict different growth rates of 
subsequent activity, based on differences in the average GDP growth rates of the countries in 
which their activities were initially concentrated.  These predicted growth rates then become the 
independent variables in second stage equations used to explain changes in domestic business 
operations. 
In order to serve as a valid instrument it is necessary that the average GDP growth rate of 
foreign countries in which a firm invests affects its domestic operations only by influencing the 
level and character of its foreign operations.  This restriction cannot be directly tested, but 
reasonable specifications of production processes within multinational firms imply that by far the 
most likely channel by which foreign economic prosperity affects firms with local operations is 
by affecting local operations.  Three scenarios in which the instrument would be invalid are 
worth noting; these are addressed by the empirical tests below.  First, parent firms that are trying 
to grow quickly may invest in countries that expected to grow quickly in the future.  This 
possibility can be addressed by conducting tests using measures of unexpected growth as 
instruments.  Second, the activities of certain industries might be concentrated in certain 
countries, and domestic and foreign operations might experience common shocks.  For example, 
if most of the foreign operations of electronic component manufacturing parents were located in 
Asia, a productivity shock to the industry could be associated with high growth in Asia, and it 
could have a direct effect on the growth of parent firms in the industry.  This possibility can be 
addressed by including fixed effects that are specific to individual industries in particular periods 
in the main specifications of interest.  Third, firms might export to the same foreign countries in 
which they invest, in which case foreign economic growth might stimulate exports and thereby 
domestic operations directly.  This possibility can be addressed by including an independent 
variable equal to export-weighted foreign economic growth. 
It is also possible that foreign investment by American firms affects local GDP growth 
rates, making foreign GDP growth rates inadmissible as instruments in explaining foreign 
investment.  This effect is, however, likely to be very small in magnitude except for a certain 
number of small countries, principally tax havens, that draw disproportionate volumes of U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                             
measure to alternatives including log changes and growth rates calculated relative to initial values.   13
investment.
7  Since the empirical work presented in the paper uses average foreign GDP growth 
rates weighted by investment levels, this consideration is very unlikely to contaminate the 
estimated results. 
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
The empirical work presented in section 4 is based on the most comprehensive and 
reliable available data on the activities of American multinational firms.  The Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) Benchmark Surveys of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1982, 1989, 
1994 and 1999 provide a panel of data on the financial and operating characteristics of U.S. 
multinational firms.
8  In order to limit the heterogeneity of the sample, observations are restricted 
to American firms with parent companies in manufacturing industries (as defined in the BEA 
survey using a classification that corresponds almost exactly to SIC codes 20-39).  In each of the 
four benchmark years, all affiliates with sales, assets, or net income in excess of certain size 
cutoffs of no more than $7 million in absolute value, and their parents, were required to file 
extensive reports.  Measures of aggregate foreign activity of individual firms are obtained by 
summing measures of activity across the firm’s foreign affiliates.  The surveys collect sufficient 
information to quantify domestic and foreign assets, net property, plant and equipment, 
employment compensation, employment, R&D spending, exports and total sales.
9 
The BEA collects identifiers linking parents and affiliates through time, thereby 
permitting the calculation of changes in domestic and foreign input use.  Growth rates are 
computed as ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of beginning and 
ending period levels of activity.  Since the data include four benchmark survey years – 1982, 
1989, 1994, and 1999 – it is possible to calculate changes in this normalized measure for at most 
three periods.  As the analysis considers changes only, firms that initiate or terminate global 
activities between benchmark years are not part of the analysis. 
                                                 
7 For an analysis of the effect of foreign direct investment on GDP growth rates of small tax havens, see Hines 
(2005). 
8 The International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act governs the collection of the data and the Act 
ensures that “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is prohibited.”  
Willful noncompliance with the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a prison term of one year.  As a result 
of these assurances and penalties, BEA believes that coverage is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high. 
9 Parent company equity and debt investments in foreign affiliates are subtracted from the parent’s total assets in 
order to avoid spurious correlations between changes in foreign assets and changes in domestic assets.   14
Appendix Table 1 presents data on changes in net foreign property, plant and equipment 
investment of U.S. multinationals, decomposing these changes into the growth of surviving 
firms, entry by new firms, and capital reductions due to exit by firms that were previously part of 
the sample.  The change in foreign activity attributable to the growth of surviving parents is 
considerably larger than is the change due to net entry and exit of parents in each of the three 
periods covered by the data.  For example, between 1982 and 1989, the foreign affiliates of 
surviving parents accumulated $82.2 billion of additional property, plant and equipment, a figure 
that exceeds the $72.7 billion net accumulation of all American-owned foreign affiliates during 
this period.  Between 1989 and 1994, the foreign affiliates of surviving parents accumulated 
$80.0 billion of new property, plant and equipment, out of a total of $88.2 billion.  A substantial 
fraction of the exit that occurs is the consequence of some U.S. multinational firms buying 
others.  Of the $24.6 billion of 1982 foreign net property, plant and equipment owned by firms 
that leave the sample in between 1982 and 1989, $15 billion is accounted for by firms that are 
acquired by other U.S. multinationals. 
Table 1 presents means, medians, and standard deviations of variables used in the 
regressions that follow.  The instrumental variables procedure uses foreign GDP growth rates, 
which are calculated by dividing changes (between benchmark years) in the gross domestic 
product per capita of affiliate host countries by the average of beginning and ending period 
values.
10  These country growth rates are aggregated using weights equal to a firm’s beginning of 
period affiliate net property, plant and equipment in each country.  To control for the possibility 
that GDP growth rates affect domestic levels of activity by influencing parent exports to final 
consumers abroad, some regressions include as an independent variable GDP growth rates 
weighted by a parent company’s beginning of period exports to unrelated parties.  Some 
regressions also include changes in real exchange rates, which are computed using nominal 
exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) and measures of inflation from the 
IMF's International Financial Statistics database; the real exchange rate movement is defined to 
equal the ratio of the change in the dollar-equivalent real exchange rate to the average of this rate 
at the beginning and end of period.  Firm-specific exchange rate changes equal the product of 
                                                 
10 Per capita gross domestic product is the CGDP variable reported by Heston, Summers and Aten (2002), 
representing incomes adjusted for purchasing power and reported in current dollars.   15
these real exchange rate changes and weights equal to beginning of period affiliate net property 
plant and equipment in each country. 
4.   The Relationship Between Multinational Foreign and Domestic Activity 
  The simple correlation of changes in foreign and domestic activity is clear from Figure 1, 
which presents a scatter plot of foreign and domestic sales growth rates for multinational firms in 
the sample.
11  As in the regression analysis, foreign growth rates are defined as the ratio of the 
change in a measure of foreign activity between benchmark years to the average of its values in 
these years; and domestic growth rates are similarly defined.   The upward sloping relationship 
between foreign and domestic sales growth in Figure 1 suggests a positive correlation between 
growth rates of foreign and domestic economic activity that is investigated further below. 
4.1. OLS  Specifications 
Table 2 presents estimated coefficients from OLS specifications explaining changes in 
the domestic activities of parent companies as functions of changes in their foreign activities.  
All specifications include period fixed effects, and the standard errors correct for clustering at the 
parent company level.
12  The 0.1994 coefficient reported in column 1 of Table 2 indicates that 10 
percent higher foreign net property, plant and equipment growth is associated with 2.0 percent 
higher domestic net property, plant and equipment growth by parent companies.   Asset 
accumulation displays a similar pattern, the 0.2953 coefficient reported in column 2 implying 
that 10 percent foreign asset growth is associated with three percent domestic asset growth.  The 
regressions reported in columns three and four consider changes in labor demand.  The 0.2581 
coefficient reported in column three indicates that 10 percent higher foreign employment 
compensation is associated with a 2.6 percent greater domestic employment compensation.  The 
0.2448 coefficient reported in column four similarly implies that 10 percent higher numbers of 
foreign employees is associated with 2.5 percent higher numbers of domestic employees.  
Finally, the 0.3181 coefficient reported in column five indicates that 10 percent greater foreign 
sales are associated with 3.2 percent greater domestic sales, a confirmation of the visual 
                                                 
11 Foreign sales refers to the sales of a firm’s foreign affiliates, regardless of the destination of those sales, and 
domestic sales refers to the sales of a firm’s domestic operations, regardless of the destination of those sales. 
12 Information is missing for some firms in certain years, which is why sample sizes vary between specifications in 
Table 2.   16
relationship apparent in Figure 1.  Across all of these measures of multinational firm activity, the 
OLS analysis suggests that increased foreign activity is associated with greater domestic activity. 
4.2. Instrumental  Variables Specifications 
The instrumental variables approach outlined above relies on the ability of foreign 
economic growth rates to explain changes in foreign activity levels of American multinational 
firms.  Table 3 presents the results of regressions of growth rates of foreign activity on firm-
specific weighted averages of foreign economic growth rates, the weights corresponding to 
beginning of period distributions of foreign property, plant, and equipment.  Growth rates are 
defined as in Table 2, all specifications include period fixed effects, and the standard errors 
correct for clustering at the parent level. 
The results indicate that the economic performance of foreign economies significantly 
influences the foreign activity of American multinational firms.  The 1.7802 coefficient reported 
in column one indicates that two percent faster annual average GDP growth in countries in which 
a firm invests is associated with 3.6 percent faster growth of affiliate net property, plant and 
equipment.  Similar results appear in the regressions reported in columns 2-5, whose coefficients 
imply that two percent faster annual GDP growth is associated with 2.9 percent greater foreign 
asset accumulation, 2.5 percent greater foreign employee compensation growth, 1.4 percent 
greater foreign employment growth, and 3.2 percent greater foreign sales growth. 
Foreign economic growth is associated with greater levels of foreign activity by 
American firms either because economic growth increases the value of the foreign output of 
American firms or because foreign economic growth coincides with reduced real input costs due 
to productivity gains or other changes.  While it is difficult to distinguish output from cost effects 
on the return to foreign investment, it is possible to identify the impact of foreign GDP growth 
on local and export sales by foreign affiliates, and the effects of GDP growth on sales to related 
and unrelated parties.  Such an exploration also addresses concerns that the instrumental 
variables analysis below is only relevant for certain types of foreign investments – for example, 
those that serve local markets.       17
Appendix Table 2 presents regressions in which the dependent variables are changes in 
foreign affiliate sales, distinguished by destination.  The 1.7577 coefficient in column one 
indicates that two percent faster foreign GDP growth is associated with 3.5 percent greater sales 
by foreign affiliates to local markets, while the 0.8786 coefficient in column two suggests that 
the same two percent faster foreign GDP growth is associated with 1.8 percent greater export 
sales by foreign affiliates.  Foreign economic growth stimulates greater sales by foreign affiliates 
to local markets, but also greater activity that foreign affiliates direct at other markets.  An 
analogous pattern appears in the regressions presented in columns three and four.  The 1.6313 
and 1.0964 coefficients reported in columns three and four indicate that two percent faster GDP 
growth is associated with 3.3 percent greater affiliate sales to unrelated parties, and 2.2 percent 
greater affiliate sales to related parties.  Hence it appears that only part of the effect of foreign 
GDP growth on foreign investments stems from provision of output to serve customers in local 
markets, the remainder reflecting a variety of considerations that also influence the desirability of 
foreign investment.
13 
Table 4 presents estimated coefficients from instrumental variables regressions in which 
predicted values of changes in foreign activity (based on coefficients drawn from the regressions 
presented in Table 3) are used to explain changes in domestic capital and labor demand.  The 
dependent variables in the regressions presented in Table 4 are growth rates of domestic net 
property, plant and equipment and employee compensation; results for assets, numbers of 
employees, and sales are presented in Appendix Table 4.  All specifications include period fixed 
effects, and the standard errors allow for clustering at the parent level.  The 0.2174 coefficient in 
column one of Table 4 indicates that 10 percent greater accumulation of foreign property plant 
and equipment, as predicted by host country GDP growth, is associated with 2.2 percent growth 
of domestic net property plant and equipment.  This estimated effect is quite similar to that 
                                                 
13 The regressions presented in Appendix Table 3 offer additional evidence that foreign production directed at local 
sales constitutes only part of the effect of foreign GDP growth on foreign investment.  The first two of these 
regressions introduce a new dummy variable that takes the value one for the half of the sample whose foreign 
affiliates concentrate their sales in local markets, and zero for firms whose foreign affiliates' sales are less directed at 
local markets.  The -0.2985 and -0.3349 coefficients in columns one and two are statistically insignificant.  If 
anything, their sign suggests that greater foreign economic growth actually has a smaller impact on foreign capital 
and labor expenditures for firms more focused on selling to local markets.  The regressions reported in columns 
three and four add a new dummy variable equal to one for firms whose foreign affiliates sell predominantly to 
related parties.  Again, the 0.3072 and 0.2713 coefficients reported in columns three and four are statistically   18
implied by the OLS regression reported in column 1 of Table 2, and, for a firm with the sample 
median 6.75 ratio of domestic to foreign property, plant and equipment, implies that $10 of 
additional foreign capital is associated with $14.7 of additional domestic capital.  There is no 
indication that firms accumulating capital assets in their foreign affiliates do so at the expense of 
domestic capital accumulation; instead, greater use of foreign capital appears to stimulate greater 
use of domestic capital. 
The dependent variable in the regression reported in the second column of Table 4 is the 
growth rate of domestic employee compensation; the 0.4046 coefficient indicates that greater use 
of foreign labor is associated with greater demand for domestic labor.  This estimated effect is 
somewhat larger than that implied by the 0.2581 OLS coefficient presented in column 3 of Table 
2, though the two are statistically indistinguishable.  For a firm with the sample median 4.56 
ratio of domestic to foreign employee compensation, the IV estimate implies that $10 of 
additional foreign wages is associated with $18.4 of additional domestic wages. 
The regressions presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 include foreign and domestic 
factor changes measured as growth rates.  An alternative approach, used in the regressions 
reported in columns 3 and 4, is to linearize the relationship as in equation (6), specifying changes 
in levels of domestic factor use as functions of changes in levels of foreign factor use.  The 
dependent variable in the regression reported in the third column of Table 4 is the change in 
domestic net property, plant and equipment between two benchmark years.  Predicted values of 
changes in foreign net property, plant and equipment are obtained from a first stage regression 
similar to that presented in column 1 of Table 3, but in which the change in foreign net property, 
plant and equipment is measured in levels, and weighted foreign economic growth rates are 
interacted with beginning of period foreign net property, plant and equipment to generate 
estimated foreign changes.  The 0.6720 coefficient in column three implies that $10 of additional 
foreign capital accumulation is associated with $6.7 of additional domestic capital accumulation, 
which is somewhat smaller than the effect implied by the estimate in column one for firms with 
median ratios of domestic to foreign capital.  The regression reported in column 4 of Table 4 
estimates the effect of changes in levels of foreign wages on changes in levels of domestic 
                                                                                                                                                             
insignificant and, if anything, indicate that foreign economic growth stimulates greater foreign input use among 
affiliates selling to related parties than it does among affiliates selling to unrelated parties.   19
wages, using the interaction of beginning of period foreign wages interacted with foreign 
economic growth rates as instruments for foreign wage changes.  The 1.1128 coefficient in 
column 4 indicates that $10 of additional foreign employee compensation is associated with 
$11.1 of additional domestic employee compensation, though this effect is not statistically 
significant, and again somewhat smaller than the effect implied by the coefficient in column two 
for a firm with the median ratio of domestic to foreign wages. 
4.3. Alternative  Specifications 
  If firms with rapidly growing domestic activities choose to locate their foreign operations 
in relatively high growth economies, the results in Table 4 may not accurately reflect the 
influence of higher foreign growth rates on domestic factor demands.  In order to evaluate this 
possibility, the regressions presented in the first two columns of Table 5 use measures of 
unexpected host country growth as instruments.  Specifically, these instruments are computed by 
taking residuals from a regression of GDP growth on its own lag, then weighting these residuals 
using firm specific weights that correspond to beginning of period levels of net property, plant 
and equipment.  The regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 are run on the same 
sample as that used in the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, and the estimated 
coefficients are quite similar (0.2132 and 0.2174 in the case of property, plant and equipment; 
0.3999 and 0.4046 in the case of wages), suggesting that it is the unpredictable component of 
GDP growth that is responsible for the results appearing in Table 4. 
  Some countries may be dominated by small numbers of industries, in which firms 
experience common shocks that affect their foreign and domestic activities; in such cases, the 
foreign and domestic investments of the firms, and the GDPs of the countries in which they 
invest, would all be positively correlated.  In order to guard against the possibility that this 
phenomenon is important enough to drive the results, the regressions reported in columns three 
and four of Table 5 include fixed effects specific to each two-digit parent industry for each time 
period in the data.  The estimated coefficients are again very similar (0.2560 and 0.2174 in the 
case of property, plant and equipment; 0.3948 and 0.4046 in the case of wages) to those in Table 
4.   20
  Another potential concern with the identification strategy used in the instrumental 
variables regressions is that firms with considerable foreign direct investment in a country might 
also export significant amounts of its final product from the U.S. to end customers in the same 
country.  If this were the case, local GDP growth would be an invalid instrument, since high 
foreign economic growth would directly stimulate domestic investment to meet export demand.  
The regressions presented in Table 6 address this possibility by including as an independent 
variable a measure of foreign GDP growth weighted by beginning of period firm exports to 
unrelated parties, constructed from BEA data that identify the destination of each firm’s U.S. 
exports to unrelated parties.  Since not all parents are exporters, the use of trade share data 
reduces sample sizes somewhat, but, as the regressions reported in columns one and two of Table 
6 illustrate, the inclusion of trade-weighted GDP growth rates has very little impact on the 
estimated effects of foreign capital accumulation and wage growth.  Ten percent faster foreign 
capital accumulation is associated with 2.6 percent faster domestic capital accumulation in the 
regression reported in column one, and ten percent faster foreign wage growth is associated with 
3.8 percent faster domestic wage growth in the regression reported in column two.  The 
estimated direct effects of trade-weighted foreign GDP growth are negligible in both regressions. 
It is also possible that real exchange rate movements that are associated with differences 
in GDP growth rates might influence relative prices in a way that directly affects factor demands 
by multinational firms.  The regressions reported in columns three and four of Table 6 address 
this concern by including measures of real exchange rate changes weighted by a firm’s 
distribution of property, plant and equipment at the beginning of each period.  Estimated 
coefficients on the exchange rate variable are not significant in either regression, whereas 
inclusion of the exchange rate variable increases the estimated magnitude of the effects of 
foreign investment and wage growth on domestic activity.  The estimated 0.3479 coefficient in 
column three implies that 10 percent greater foreign investment is associated with 3.5 percent 
greater domestic investment, and the 0.4855 coefficient in column four implies that 10 percent 
greater foreign wage growth is associated with 4.9 percent greater domestic wage growth. 
The merger and acquisition activities of multinational firms raise the possibility that the 
estimated impact of foreign investment on domestic investment might reflect what happens when 
one U.S. multinational firm buys another, thereby simultaneously acquiring the target’s domestic   21
and foreign assets.  If this acquisition activity is most prevalent among firms with foreign 
affiliates located in high growth countries, then it could be responsible for the pattern that is 
apparent in the data.  In such cases the estimated effect of foreign investment on domestic 
investment may offer a misleading picture of changes in factor demands, since acquisitions may 
entail purchasing bundles of foreign and domestic assets that are not what the acquirer would 
otherwise desire.  The regressions presented in the first four columns of Table 7 address this 
potential problem by removing from the sample observations of parent companies that acquire 
other American parent companies or divisions of other parents.
14 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 present OLS specifications of regressions run on the 
restricted sample of firms, and include controls for trade-weighted GDP growth and real 
exchange rate changes.  Estimated coefficients on foreign net PPE growth and foreign wage 
growth are similar to those obtained from regressions using the whole sample and presented in 
columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.  Estimated effects of foreign changes on domestic activity in the 
instrumental variable regressions presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 are likewise similar to 
those presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the 0.3164 coefficient implying that 10 percent 
foreign investment is associated with 3.2 percent greater domestic investment, and the 0.4392 
coefficient implying that 10 percent foreign wage growth is associated with 4.4 percent greater 
domestic wage growth. 
A second issue that arises as a consequence of the empirical strategy is that reported 
estimates do not capture the effect of a domestic firm’s initial expansion in markets abroad.  
Since the IV estimation method requires the use of beginning of period values of foreign activity, 
it is not possible to construct an instrument for new foreign investment by firms without prior 
foreign exposure.  As the data in Appendix Table 1 illustrate, firms initiating activity abroad are 
responsible for only a small fraction of aggregate foreign investment, so their effect is unlikely to 
dominate the total responsiveness of domestic investment to foreign activities.  It is also possible 
to analyze a subset of observations representing the first period following a firm’s foreign entry.  
The regressions presented in columns 5-8 of Table 7 are run on this subsample of observations.  
Sample sizes are necessarily very small (351 and 347); nonetheless, the OLS results in columns 5 
                                                 
14 The BEA data identify purchases of one American multinational firm by another, and purchases of foreign 
affiliates previously owned by another firm in the BEA data.   22
and 6 are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2 of the same table for the considerably 
larger sample of firms that do not merge.  Point estimates of the effects of foreign investment and 
foreign wage growth are larger in the IV specifications reported in columns 7 and 8, but are not 
statistically significant, owing to the small sample sizes.  Thus, there is no indication that foreign 
expansion is associated with domestic contraction soon after firms initiate foreign activity. 
4.4.  Other Domestic Activities 
Greater foreign production is likely to encourage firms to expand domestic activities that 
provide tangible and intangible inputs to foreign production.  The regressions presented in Table 
8 consider the effects of greater foreign sales on domestic research and development (R&D) and 
domestic exports to affiliates located abroad.  Columns 1 and 2 report estimated coefficients 
from regressions in which the dependent variable is the change in domestic R&D.
15  The 0.3631 
estimated coefficient in the OLS regression reported in column 1 indicates that ten percent faster 
foreign sales growth is associated with 3.6 percent more rapid growth of domestic R&D 
spending.  In order to avoid bias that might arise due to the joint determination of domestic R&D 
growth and foreign affiliate sales growth, the specification in column 2 instruments for foreign 
sales growth using foreign GDP growth rates.  The 0.4931 estimated coefficient in this 
specification implies an even larger effect, ten percent faster foreign sales growth being 
associated with 4.9 percent greater domestic R&D spending.  Since foreign operations stand to 
benefit from intangible assets developed by R&D spending, it is not surprising that greater 
foreign investment might stimulate additional spending on R&D in the United States. 
Columns 3 and 4 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the growth in a parent company’s exports to its affiliates.  The estimated 0.6130 
coefficient reported in column 3 indicates that ten percent higher growth of foreign sales is 
associated with 6.1 percent greater exports from U.S. parent companies to their foreign affiliates.  
The corresponding instrumental variables coefficient of 0.4940, reported in column four, is 
slightly smaller, but nonetheless indicates that firms whose initial investments were concentrated 
in economies that subsequently grew rapidly tend to expand their exports from the United States 
to affiliates abroad.  These results are consistent with those presented in Table 4, in which   23
domestic investment and wage growth respond positively to changes in their foreign 
counterparts. 
5. Implications   
  The estimated relationship between foreign and domestic operations of American 
multinational firms carries direct implications for U.S. policies that influence levels of foreign 
investment by American companies.  The United States taxes the foreign incomes of American 
firms, permitting taxpayers to claim tax credits for foreign income tax payments and to defer 
U.S. taxation of certain unrepatriated profits of foreign subsidiaries.  There is controversy over 
the desirability of this tax regime, particularly when compared with the practice of many capital-
exporting countries that exempt foreign income from taxation.  A system of taxing foreign 
income while providing foreign tax credits is commonly justified by appeal to the principle of 
capital export neutrality, itself based on a model in which foreign investment reduces domestic 
investment on a one-for-one basis.  Similar implications have been derived for monetary and 
commercial policies that influence exchange rates and world interest rates.  Should the volume of 
domestic economic activity not fall in response to increased foreign investment, but instead rise, 
then policies that maximize national and world welfare look very different than they would if 
foreign and domestic business operations compete for the same costly resources.
16  In particular, 
efficient policies in such an environment typically entail a more favorable stance toward 
outbound investment by American firms.  Any such policy evaluation, however, rests on the 
reliability of estimated relationships between foreign and domestic activities. 
Tables 4-8 present regressions that offer evidence that increases in foreign operations 
stimulate domestic economic activities during the 1982-1999 period.  These effects of foreign 
operations on domestic sales and factor demands are identified by differences between firms in 
the growth rates of the foreign economies in which they invest, which in turn affect the rates at 
which firms expand their foreign investments.  As a result, the estimates are cross-sectional in 
nature: they reflect comparisons of the subsequent domestic activities of firms that invested in 
certain foreign countries with firms that invested in others. 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Growth rates that serve as dependent variables in Table 8 are computed in the same way as other growth rates: 
they are ratios of changes between benchmark years to averages of beginning and end of period values.     24
The domestic impact of policies that affect foreign investment levels of all American 
firms cannot be directly inferred from the reported estimates.  The total domestic effects of such 
policies include price changes that affect all firms and are not reflected in cross-sectional 
comparisons of some firms with others.  These general equilibrium considerations include 
changes in output prices of industries with significant foreign exposure, any endogenous effects 
on interest rates, exchange rates, wages, prices of investment goods, and others.  These 
endogenous price changes are likely to attenuate, but not reverse in sign, the estimated firm-level 
effects of foreign operations on domestic sales, capital accumulation, employment, R&D 
spending, and exports.  In the absence of a complete general equilibrium analysis it is difficult to 
estimate the aggregate magnitudes of these effects on the U.S. economy, but there is nonetheless 
a presumption that aggregate effects resemble firm-level effects in sign, and may also be similar 
in magnitude. 
6.  Conclusion 
Firms that expand their foreign operations simultaneously expand their domestic 
operations, and this relationship persists when actual foreign expansions are replaced by 
predicted values based on weighted growth rates of foreign economies.  There is evidence that 
growing foreign investment is associated with growing domestic capital accumulation, 
employment, R&D, and exports to related parties.  While this firm-level evidence must be 
appropriately modified by general equilibrium considerations in evaluating aggregate policy 
effects, it nevertheless follows that greater foreign investment by individual American firms can 
be expected to stimulate additional domestic economic activity by the same firms. 
This conclusion runs counter to the simple intuition that foreign direct investment 
represents a diversion of domestic economic activity by firms undertaking the foreign 
investment.  The intuition is based on the notion that each firm has a fixed amount of global 
production, so additional foreign production comes at the cost of reduced domestic production.  
Neither firms nor economies operate on such a zero-sum basis, so there is ample reason to think 
that greater foreign production might be associated with greater demand for productive factors in 
the United States, and associated greater levels of activity.  While there may be considerable 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 The standard international tax theory is developed in Musgrave (1969) and Horst (1980), and reviewed by Gordon   25
individual variation, the average experience of all American multinational firms over the last two 
decades is inconsistent with the simple story that foreign expansions come at the cost of reduced 
domestic activity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Hines (2002); Keen and Piekkola (1997), Hines (1999), and Desai and Hines (2003) offer recent critiques.   26
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 Note: The vertical and horizontal axes of the figure measure growth rates of domestic sales and foreign sales. Growth 
rates are defined as ratios of changes in sales to averages of beginning and ending period values.  Each observation is a 
single multinational firm between two benchmark years, the benchmark years consisting of 1982, 1989, 1994 and 1999.
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Foreign Sales Growth
Domestic and Foreign Sales GrowthMean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Foreign Affiliate Asset Growth 0.4119 0.4284 0.6775
Foreign Affiliate Net PPE Growth 0.3507 0.3749 0.7876
Foreign Affiliate Employment Compensation Growth 0.3417 0.3668 0.6957
Foreign Affiliate Employment Growth 0.1341 0.1221 0.6995
Foreign Affiliate Sales Growth 0.3707 0.3864 0.6518
Parent Weighted GDP Growth Rate 0.2495 0.2118 0.1187
Domestic Asset Growth 0.3238 0.3204 0.5401
Domestic Net PPE Growth 0.1569 0.1612 0.9520
Domestic Employment Compensation Growth 0.2407 0.2570 0.4892
Domestic Employment Growth 0.0193 0.0284 0.4720
Domestic Sales Growth 0.2803 0.2857 0.4596
Foreign Affiliate Net PPE Growth (Levels) 129,666 3,516 1,129,607
Foreign Affiliate Employment Compensation Growth (Levels) 40,541 4,622 247,635
Domestic Net PPE Growth (Levels) 113,839 9,996 3,995,837
Domestic Employment Compensation Growth (Levels) 82,321 18,887 566,158
Parent R&D Growth 0.2450 0.3373 0.9206
Growth of Parent Exports to Affiliates 0.2618 0.4083 1.0896
GDP Growth Weighted by Parent Trade 0.2346 0.1995 0.1102
Change in Real Exchange Rate -0.0328 -0.0497 0.1175
this rate at the beginning and end of the period, using weights equal to start of period PPE.  Real exchange rates are calculated using 




Notes: Growth rates of assets, net property, plant and equipment (PPE), employment compensation, employment, and sales are 
computed as the ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of beginning and ending year levels of activity.  
Parent Weighted GDP growth rate is the weighted change, between benchmark years, in the per capita gross domestic product of affiliate 
host countries, divided by the average of beginning and ending period values.  GDP data are drawn from Heston, Summers, and Aten 
(2002).  Country weights used for each parent equal beginning of period local net PPE levels.  Growth measures based on levels are 
unscaled weighted changes in activity.  Growth rates of parent research and development, and parent exports to affiliates, are ratios of 
changes between benchmark years to average values of these measures in the benchmark years.  GDP growth weighted by Parent Trade 
is calculated using weights equal to beginning of period parent exports to unrelated parties.  Changes in real exchange rates are weighted 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 1.0659 0.2447 0.1773 -0.0122 0.1654











No. of Obs. 2,286 2,420 2,282 2,274 2,429







Note: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (column 1), assets (column 2), employment 
compensation (column 3), employment (column 4), and sales (column 5).  Domestic and foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity 
between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values.  All regressions are OLS specifications that include period fixed 
effects.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 
Constant -0.1764 0.1199 0.0384 -0.0772 0.0493
(0.1236) (0.0550) (0.1190) (0.1114) (0.0500)
1.7802 1.4721 1.2356 0.6965 1.5797
(0.2911) (0.2572) (0.2799) (0.2623) (0.2298)
No. of Obs. 2,286 2,420 2,282 2,274 2,429
R-Squared 0.0499 0.0726 0.0490 0.0208 0.0841
Table 3
Note: The dependent variables are foreign growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (column 1), assets (column 2), employment 
compensation growth (column 3), employment growth (column 4), and sales (column 5).  Foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity 
between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values.  Parent Weighted GDP growth rates are the weighted changes, 
between benchmark periods, in per capita gross domestic products of affiliate host countries, divided by averages of beginning and end of period 
values.  GDP data are drawn from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  Weights equal parent beginning of period net property plant and equipment in 
each country.  All regressions are OLS specifications that include period fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for 
clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses. 
Parent Weighted 
GDP Growth Rate
Foreign GDP Growth and Changes in Foreign OperationsDependent Variable:
Domestic Net 













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.2701 0.1372 5912.1940 50341.9400





No. of Obs. 2,286 2,282 2,286 2,282
weighted using weights equal to the beginning of period net property, plant and equipment in a country.  Instruments used in the 
regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 equal the instruments used in the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2, multiplied by 
beginning of period foreign PPE (column 3) and beginning of period foreign employment compensation (column 4).  All specifications 





Note: The dependent variable in column 1 is growth of domestic property, plant and equipment (PPE), and the dependent variable in 
column 2 is growth of domestic employment compensation.  Domestic and foreign growth rates are defined as ratios of changes in activity 
between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values.   The dependent variable in column 3 is the change in 
domestic net PPE between benchmark years, and the dependent variable in column 4 is the change in domestic employment compensation. 
Independent variables are corresponding foreign changes, measured as growth rates in columns 1 and 2, and as level changes in columns 3 
and 4.  All regressions are IV specifications in which parent weighed GDP growth rates are used as instruments for foreign growth rates or 
changes in levels.  In the first two columns, instruments are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change in 
host country GDP per capita in between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the period.  
Values of per capita gross domestic product are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  These GDP growth rates are then
Table 4
Foreign Net PPE 
Growth (Rates/Levels)













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.2714 0.1385 1.0020 0.1623





Period Fixed Effects? YYNN
Period/Industry Fixed 
Effects? NNYY
IV w/ Parent Weighted GDP 
Growth? NNYY
IV w/ Parent Weighted GDP 
Growth Residuals? YYNN
No. of Obs. 2,286 2,282 2,286 2,282
Note: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (columns 1 and 3) and growth rates 
of domestic employment compensation (columns 2 and 4).  Domestic and foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between 
benchmark years to the average of the beginning and end of period values.  All regressions are IV specifications. Parent weighed measures 
of host country GDP growth are used as instruments for foreign affiliate growth.  Instruments in the first and second columns equal 
residuals from regressions of GDP growth rates on its own lag, with these residuals then weighted by beginning of period PPE.  
Instruments in columns 3 and 4 weight host country GDP by beginning of period net PPE.  The specifications in columns 1 and 2 include 
period fixed effects and the specifications in columns 3 and 4 include separate fixed effects for each 2-digit industry in each period.  




Foreign Net PPE Growth













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.2518 0.0964 1.0373 0.0977





0.0451 -0.0122 0.0223 -0.0673
(0.1268) (0.1435) (0.1330) (0.1557)
0.5051 0.2522
(0.2795) (0.3132)
No. of Obs. 1,894 1,888 1,872 1,866
Note: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (columns 1 and 3), and employment 
compensation (columns 2 and 4).  Domestic and foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of 
beginning and end of period values.  All regressions are IV specifications and include period fixed effects. Parent weighed GDP growth rates are 
used as instruments for foreign growth rates.  Instrumental variables are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change 
in host country GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the period.  Values of 
per capita gross domestic product are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  These GDP growth rates are then weighted by beginning 
of period net PPE.  Changes in the real exchange rate equal ratios of changes in the beginning and end of period real host country U.S. dollar 
exchange rates to average values at the beginning and end of the period, weighted by beginning of period affiliate PPE.  Real host country U.S. 
dollar exchange rates are computed using nominal exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002), and inflation is drawn from
the IMF International Financial Statistics database.  GDP Growth Weighted by Parent Trade is the weighted average of GDP growth rates, 
computed using weights equal to beginning of period parent exports to unrelated parties in a country.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.
GDP Growth Weighted by 
Parent Trade
Change in Real Exchange 
Rate
Table 6
Foreign Net PPE Growth
Foreign Employment 
Compensation Growth


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 1.0918 0.1640 0.2214 0.1069 0.3731 0.2843 0.0247 -0.0956
(0.0583) (0.0325) (0.0623) (0.0646) (0.1007) (0.0794) (0.2899) (0.2821)
0.1745 0.3164 0.1383 0.8700
(0.0190) (0.1498) (0.0394) (0.4948)
0.2365 0.4392 0.1888 0.8732
(0.0194) (0.1890) (0.0338) (0.4513)
0.0722 0.0484 0.0379 -0.0075 0.1667 0.0230 -0.1910 -0.0979
(0.1339) (0.1443) (0.1424) (0.1567) (0.4875) (0.3559) (0.6962) (0.5496)
0.3263 -0.0231 0.4906 0.2087 1.0780 0.4097 1.7792 1.1938
(0.1691) (0.1543) (0.2673) (0.2841) (0.3355) (0.2731) (0.6868) (0.6823)




Focus on New 
Entrants? NNNNYYYY
No. of Obs. 1,535 1,530 1,535 1,530 351 347 351 347
R-Squared 0.7427 0.1291 0.4734 0.1153
Note: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) and growh of domestic employment compensation (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8).  
Domestic and foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of beginning and end of period values.  The regressions in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 are OLS 
specifications and the regressions in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 are IV specifications. Parent weighed GDP growth rates are used as instruments for foreign growth rates.  Instrumental variables are calculated 
by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change in host country GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the period.  Values of 
per capita gross domestic product are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  GDP growth rates are weighted by beginning of period net PPE.  Changes in real exchange rates equal ratios of 
changes in beginning and end of period real host country U.S. dollar exchange rates to averages at the beginning and end of the period, weighted by beginning of period affiliate PPE.  Real host country 
U.S. dollar exchange rates are computed using nominal exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) and measures of inflation from the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
GDP Growth Weighted by Parent Trade is the weigted average of GDP growth rates, computed using weights equal to beginning of period parent exports to unrelated parties in a country.  The sample is 
restricted to non-acquirers in columns 1-4 and to new entrants in columns 5-8.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.
Table 7





Change in Real 
Exchange Rate
GDP Growth 
Weighted by Parent 
Trade






Growth of Parent 
Exports to 
Affiliates
Growth of Parent 
Exports to 
Affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.9723 1.0963 1.7618 1.8047
(0.0325) (0.2084) (0.0146) (0.0888)
0.3631 0.4931 0.6130 0.4940
(0.0341) (0.2185) (0.0406) (0.2464)
IV w/ Parent 
Weighted GDP 
Growth? NYNY
No. of Obs. 2,095 2,095 2,278 2,278
R-Squared 0.1135 0.1654
Table 8
Foreign Growth, Domestic R&D, and Domestic Exports
Foreign Sales 
Growth
Note:  The dependent variables are the growth rate of parent R&D expenditures (columns 1 and 2) and parent exports to affiliates (columns 3 
and 4).  Growth rates are computed by taking ratios of changes in measures between benchmark years to averages of beginning and end of 
period values.  The regressions in columns 1 and 3 are OLS specifications, and the regressions in columns 2 and 4 are IV specifications.  
Weighed measures of host country GDP growth are used as instruments for foreign affiliate sales growth in columns 2 and 4.  Instruments are 
calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as changes in host country GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by 
average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the period.  Values of per capita gross domestic product are taken from Heston, Summers, 
and Aten (2002).  GDP growth rates are weighted by beginning of period affiliate PPE.  All specifications include period/industry fixed 
effects.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses.1982-1989 1989-1994 1994-1999
Total Change 72,689,984          88,184,907          100,150,325       
Growth of affiliates of existing parents that 
survive and remain in manufacturing 82,235,543          80,029,273          134,070,620       
Beginning of period value of affiliate net PPE 
for affiliates of parents that exit 24,603,467          9,856,598            71,008,672         
End of period value of affiliate net PPE for 
affiliates of parents that enter 15,057,908          18,012,232          37,088,377         
Beginning of period value of affiliate net ppe 
for affiliates of parents that are acquired by 
other U.S. parents 15,141,695          2,825,726            46,575,414         
Changes in Aggregate Foreign Property, Plant and Equipment
Appendix Table 1
Period
Note: The first line of the table presents aggregate changes in foreign net property, plant and equipment (PPE) between benchmark survey 
years for manufacturing firms in the BEA sample.  The table presents values (measured in units of $1,000) of differences in current dollars.  
The second line presents aggregate changes in PPE restricted to firms present in the sample at both the start and end of the period.  The third 
line presents the aggregate starting value of PPE for firms that exit the sample between benchmark years, and the fourth line presents 
aggregate PPE of firms that enter the sample between benchmark years.  The fifth line presents aggregate values of start of period PPE for 

















(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Constant -0.0875 0.0770 -0.0603 -0.1158
(0.1434) (0.1618) (0.1289) (0.1036)
1.7577 0.8786 1.6313 1.0964
(0.3387) (0.3884) (0.3034) (0.4586)
No. of Obs. 2,305 2,184 2,314 2,048
R-Squared 0.0642 0.0312 0.0717 0.0277
Appendix Table 2
Foreign GDP Growth and Foreign Sales by Destination
Parent Weighted 
GDP Growth Rate
Note: The dependent variables are growth rates of affiliate local sales in the affiliate's host country (column 1), affiliate sales 
outside of the affiliate's host country (column 2), affiliate sales to unrelated parties (column 3), and affiliate sales to related 
parties (column 4).  Growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end 
of period values.  Parent Weighted GDP growth rates are weighted changes, between benchmark periods, in per capita gross 
domestic product of affiliate host countries, divided by averages of beginning and end of period values.  GDP data are drawn 
from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  Weights equal parent beginning of period net property plant and equipment in each 
country.  All regressions are OLS specifications that include period fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.2345 -0.0914 -0.1037 0.0431
(0.1289) (0.1293) (0.1272) (0.1275)
1.9034 1.5488 1.5932 1.2841









No. of Obs. 2,224 2,225 2,224 2,225
R-Squared 0.0488 0.0519 0.0487 0.0556
Appendix Table 3
Sales Destinations and the Effect of Foreign GDP Growth on Foreign Operations
Parent Weighted GDP 
Growth Rate
High Local Sales Dummy
parentheses.
High Local Sales Dummy 
* Parent Weighted GDP 
Growth Rate
High Related Sales 
Dummy
High Related Sales 
Dummy * Parent Weighted 
GDP Growth Rate
Note: The dependent variables are foreign growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (columns 1 and 2) and employment 
compensation (columns 3 and 4).  Foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the 
beginning and end of period values.  Parent Weighted GDP growth rates are weighted changes, between benchmark periods, in per 
capita gross domestic product of affiliate host countries, divided by averages of beginning and end of period values.  The High Local 
Sales Dummy equals one for parent companies whose foreign affiliates sell above-median fractions of their output to local host country 
markets, and is zero otherwise.  The High Related Sales Dummy is equals one for parent companies whose foreign affiliates sell above-
median fractions of their output to related parties, and is zero otherwise.  GDP data are drawn from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  
Weights equal parent beginning of period net property plant and equipment in each country.  All regressions are OLS specifications that 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.2658 -0.0112 0.1747 0.5772 -0.0135 0.1783











IV w/ Parent 
Weighted GDP 
Growth? YYYNNN
IV w/ Parent 
Weighted GDP 
Growth Residuals? NNNYYY
No. of Obs. 2,420 2,274 2,429 2,420 2,274 2,429
Note: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of assets (columns 1 and 4), employment (columns 2 and 5) and sales (columns 3 and 6).  
Domestic and foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of beginning and end of period values.  All 
regressions are IV specifications. Instruments in columns one through three weight host country GDP growth rates by beginning of period PPE.  
Instruments in the last three columns are residuals from regressions of GDP growth rates on its own lag, weighted by beginning of period PPE.  The 
specifications in columns 1-3 include period fixed effects and the specifications in columns 4-6 include period/industry fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity-









Effects of Foreign Operations on Domestic Assets, Employment, and Sales